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Does Coresidence Improve an Elderly Parent’s Health? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It is generally believed that intergenerational coresidence by elderly parents and adult 
children provides old-age security for parents. Though such coresidence is still the most 
common living arrangement in many countries, empirical evidence of its benefits to 
parental health is scarce. Using Indonesian data and a program evaluation technique that 
accounts for non-random selection and heterogeneous treatment effect, we find robust 
evidence of a negative coresidence effect. We also find heterogeneity in the coresidence 
effect. Socially active elderly parents are less likely to be in coresidence, and when they 
do live with a child, they experience a better coresidence effect. 
Keywords: Intergenerational coresidence, informal care, elderly health, treatment effect, 
factor structure model 
JEL codes: I12, J1, C31 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that living with adult children improves the health outcomes of 
elderly parents through the provision of valuable family support. Arguably, coresidence 
is the most comprehensive form of informal care, offering immediate instrumental, 
emotional, and financial assistance. For generations, intergenerational coresidence has 
been relied upon to protect the welfare of elderly parents, particularly in developing and 
middle-income countries where public support systems for the elderly are 
underdeveloped. 
 Despite the prevalence of informal care by adult children and its indisputable role 
in today’s aging societies (e.g., OECD, 2005), solid empirical evidence of the presumed 
beneficial role of coresidence with a child is scarce. On the contrary, nationally 
representative data sets from numerous countries (e.g., the US, Japan, China, and 
Indonesia) and many recent studies both show worse health outcomes for parents in 
intergenerational coresidence than for parents living independently. 
 Researchers have discussed various pathways through which intergenerational 
coresidence may affect parental health negatively. Elderly parents may transfer their 
resources to adult children (Cameron and Cobb-Clark, 2001; Schroder-Butterfill, 2003; 
Johar and Maruyama, 2011). Excessive reliance and caregiving burden on children may 
reduce elderly parents’ incentive to invest in their health to extend their life (Maruyama, 
2012). Economic development and population aging may have reduced the supply of 
family support by adult children relative to its demand, which leads to tension and 
conflict between generations and weakens the bargaining position of elderly parents 
(Asis et al., 1995; Hermalin, 2000; Giles et al., 2003; Lachs and Pillemer, 2004; Zhang, 
2004; Chan, 2005; Newberry, 2010; Teo, 2010). Whether the negative effect of 
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intergenerational coresidence dominates has significant policy implications, especially 
for countries that expect to rely on family informal care in the foreseeable future. 
This paper aims to advance the literature by separating the real causal effect from 
various confounding factors. We use data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS). The population of interest is elderly parents, defined as elderly individuals who 
have at least one living adult child. Verifying whether the undesirable correlation is 
indeed causal is a challenging empirical task because of the absence of experimental 
data. We follow the program evaluation literature. In our setup, coresidence by an 
elderly parent and an adult child is referred to as the ‘treatment’. The treatment group 
consists of elderly parents who live with a child and the control group consists of 
elderly parents who have a child but do not live with a child. The outcome of interest is 
parental health status and survival. 
There are three classes of confounding factors that prevent us from applying a 
simple regression framework: (1) reverse causality, (2) non-random selection, and (3) 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Reverse causality concerns the possibility that 
coresidence occurs in response to the deterioration of parental health. To mitigate the 
potential bias due to reverse causality, we use the panel structure of the IFLS. We use 
the most recent two waves of the IFLS, IFLS3 (2000) and IFLS4 (2007), and focus on 
the health and survival outcomes of elderly parents after seven years, conditional on 
health and coresidence status in the base period. To address non-random selection and 
heterogeneity, we employ the factor structure model of Aakvick, Heckman, and Vytlacil 
(2005). This model provides a flexible yet parsimonious and tractable specification that 
allows us to correct for non-random selection into coresidence and to accommodate 
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heterogeneity in the coresidence effect. These confounding factors, while common, 
have never been adequately addressed by previous studies on this topic. 
Non-random selection, especially selection by unobservable factors, may lead to a 
significant bias. Even after controlling for observed characteristics, coresiding parents 
may possess very different characteristics from non-coresiding parents, and these 
differences may result in different health outcomes. For example, the parents who are 
more likely to coreside may also be healthier, even after controlling for observed health 
status, thereby biasing the coresidence effect estimate upward. 
Heterogeneity in the treatment effect is another concern receiving increasing 
attention in the program evaluation literature. In our case, it is reasonable to suspect that 
the coresidence effect would vary by various family characteristics such as health status, 
economic status, living environment, and closeness among family members. Suppose 
families experience heterogeneous effects of equal magnitude in opposite directions. 
Then the resulting overall effect averages zero, and in a homogeneous treatment effect 
framework, an econometrician will incorrectly conclude that coresidence has no sizable 
effect on all parents. Furthermore, by examining the extent and patterns of 
heterogeneity, we can better understand the mechanism behind the coresidence effect 
and offer relevant input to policymakers.
1
 
For our rich, flexible model, identification is a major concern. We employ two 
identification strategies. First, we exploit the richness of the IFLS to provide exogenous 
determinants of coresidence decision (i.e. instruments) utilizing Indonesia’s 
multicultural background. Indonesia comprises over 300 distinct ethnolinguistic groups 
with their own traditional rules and practices, called adat. Adat influences a wide range 
                                                          
1
 See Basu (2011) for a discussion of the importance of heterogeneous treatment effect for policies. 
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of aspects of an Indonesian’s life from birth- to death-related matters, including the 
coresidence decisions of families. We use a collection of adat to fully exploit 
exogenous variation across adat and to enhance the efficiency of our empirical 
estimates.  
Second, we extend the binary outcome framework of Aakvick, Heckman, and 
Vytlacil (2005) by allowing for a five-categorical ordered outcome, combining four-
categorical self-assessed health information with the survival status. The original 
Aakvick, Heckman, and Vytlacil model simultaneously estimates three binary-outcome 
equations for selection, outcomes under treatment, and outcomes in non-treatment, in 
which the correlation among three equations is fully parameterized through an 
unobservable factor; thus the identification of this model is more challenging than 
standard bivariate binary models. Our extension to the ordered framework allows us to 
fully utilize the health status information in data to further aid identification, requiring 
only a few fairly reasonable extra assumptions. We find that this extension greatly 
improves the stability of estimation procedure and the robustness of results. 
Our results are summarized in three key findings. First, a descriptive data analysis 
reveals significantly worse health outcomes of elderly parents in coresidence. The seven 
year mortality rate is 5.3 percentage points higher for coresiding parents, despite no 
marked difference in baseline health between the coresidence and non-coresidence 
groups. 
Second, when we account for non-random selection by unobserved factors, the 
estimated average treatment effect is to decrease elderly parents’ seven year survival 
rate by 10.0 percentage points, or 1.38 percentage points per year. This finding suggests 
that previous studies that do not adequately deal with selection on unobservables 
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overestimate the coresidence effect. Although this point estimate comes with a wide 
confidence interval, numerous sensitivity checks consistently find a negative effect, 
suggesting that the popular belief of positive coresidence effect is unlikely. 
Third, the coresidence effect exhibits considerable heterogeneity. The estimated 
coresidence effect on the treated is significant and strongly negative. The seven year 
survival rate of elderly parents in coresidence in the base period would be 18.9 
percentage points higher if they had lived independently. Both observed and unobserved 
factors generate this heterogeneity. Part of the heterogeneity is related to parents’ social 
interactions. Elderly parents who work and are involved in community activities are less 
likely to be in coresidence, and if they do live with a child, they tend to experience a 
better coresidence effect. Wealth has a protective effect only if parents live without 
children. These results suggest that excessive parent-child dependence contributes to the 
negative coresidence effect.  
 
2. Literature and Indonesian Context 
2.1. Existing Evidence of Coresidence Effect 
A negative association between parental survival and coresidence with a child is found 
in many survey data. Maruyama (2012) reports that the three year mortality rate for 
Japanese parents over 65 who live with children is 3.6 percentage points higher than 
that of parents who live without children. In China, Li et al. (2009) report that the two 
year mortality rate for Chinese parents over 77 who live with a child is 5.3 percentage 
points higher than the overall sample mortality rate. In Indonesia, based on IFLS3 and 
IFLS4, we find that the seven year mortality rate of elderly parents over 60 is 5.3 
percentage points higher if they live with a child. Higher mortality rates for parents in 
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coresidence are not unique to Asian countries. Our calculation using the US Health and 
Retirement Study 2006-2008 shows that the two year mortality rate for coresiding 
parents over 65 is 4.6 percentage points higher than that of non-coresiding parents. 
The literature has accumulated a number of attempts to verify whether this 
unconditional mean difference indeed reflects the true causal effect of coresidence. 
Recent studies exploit the wider availability of panel data to address the reverse 
causality problem, but their findings are mixed.
2
 On the one hand, a few studies find a 
positive coresidence effect: from the US, Silverstein and Bengtson (1991) and Liang et 
al. (2005); from China, Chen and Silverstein (2000), Liu and Zhang (2004), Silverstein 
et al. (2006), and Chen and Short (2008). On the other hand, many studies find that 
coresidence has a negative effect on parents. In China, Li et al. (2009) find that elderly 
parents in coresidence are more likely to have daily limitations and are not less likely to 
die than parents living alone. In Japan, elderly mothers are found to have more than 
double the risk of heart disease when they coreside with children (Ikeda et al., 2009).  
They are also found to have higher mortality rates when they are cared for by daughters 
than by a spouse (Nishi et al., 2010). In Singapore, Chan et al. (2011) find severer 
depressive symptoms among elderly parents who live with children than among parents 
who live with children and a spouse. In Israel, Walter-Ginzburg et al. (2002) find that 
elderly parents who live with children have higher mortality risk than the lone elderly, 
especially than those who have extensive social engagements. 
To the best of our knowledge, Do and Malhotra (2012) and Maruyama (2012) are 
the only studies that attempt to correct for selection on unobservables. Using an 
instrumental variable technique, Do and Malhotra (2012) find that coresidence reduces 
                                                          
2
 Most early studies, found in the gerontology, sociology, demography, and public health literatures, 
suffer from reverse causation because they rely mainly on cross sectional analysis (e.g., Pillemer and 
Suitor, 1991; Ng et al., 2004). 
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depressive symptoms among South Korean widowed elderly mothers. They use the 
number of sons as an instrument for coresidence and argue that it is an appropriate 
instrument in the Korean setting because it is related to traditional rules of coresidence 
and should not directly affect parental health. Maruyama (2012) applies the same 
empirical framework as the present study for Japanese data, and finds a significant, 
negative treatment effect on the treated. 
2.2. Why Negative Coresidence Effect? 
The old age security hypothesis argues that parents have a child and invest in the child’s 
education and health so that the child will repay the parents in the future by providing 
monetary and non-monetary transfers to the parent (e.g., Nugent, 1985). This motive is 
particularly relevant in traditional societies that feature close family ties but lack a 
reliable public support system. If children live with their elderly parents to provide old-
age support, coresidence is predicted to have a positive effect on parental health. Using 
data in the late 1980s from rural Pakistan, Kochar (2000) finds evidence that elderly 
parents’ labor supply decreases with their coresiding children’s income. 
The literature discusses several mechanisms that overturn this prediction. First, 
resource transfers, monetary and non-monetary, may flow from parents to children in 
coresidence. Elderly parents in good health often remain in employment even when they 
live with adult children (Keaseberry, 2001; Cameron and Cobb-Clark, 2001 and 2005).  
Parents with a regular income source such as a pension are particularly prone to having 
dependants, and they often assume full-parenting responsibilities for adult children and 
grandchildren (Schroder-Butterfill, 2003). Johar and Maruyama (2011) find that most 
coresidence formation in Indonesia is motivated by the children’s need rather than the 
parents’ need. 
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Second, coresidence may worsen parental health because excessive reliance and 
coresidence burdens on children create disincentives for altruistic parents to invest in 
their health to extend their life. Maruyama (2012) finds supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis in Japanese families. 
Third, children in coresidence may provide no support. Today’s economic 
development and modernization erode traditional filial piety and the authoritarian 
relationship between generations. This leads to elderly parents being at greater risk of 
disrespect and neglect (Lachs and Pillemer, 2004; Newberry, 2010). Using data from 
numerous countries, the literature has documented increasing evidence of internal 
disagreements and conflicts in shared households due to the clash of values and 
declining tolerance by the younger generation (Giles et al., 2003; Zhang, 2004). 
Behind these three mechanisms is the weakened bargaining position of parents. 
When demand for old-age support is large and supply is small, the price of old-age 
security is higher and thereby the coresidence effect is more likely to be negative. 
2.3. Indonesian Context 
Indonesia has a tradition of close family ties and intergenerational coresidence. This 
tradition was emphasized and reinforced in the 1960s Suharto era as the family principle 
(kekeluargaan): the father is the heart of the family and respectful children defer to the 
decisions of the father (Teo, 2010). Most parents expect to live with their child in the 
old age. At the same time, public welfare support for the elderly is underdeveloped, and 
a pension is available almost exclusively for public servants and retirees of large firms. 
When elderly individuals have no child or do not live with a child, they live alone, with 
a spouse only, or with others such as siblings. These elderly individuals may get support 
from relatives, neighbors, charity organizations, new marriage, or patronage from 
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previous employers. Nursing homes are generally expensive and often not acceptable 
among Indonesians. Families regard institutional care for elderly parents as taboo. 
 The supply of informal care increasingly has difficulty meeting demand. The 
number of Indonesians aged 60 and over is estimated to increase steadily to 28.8 million 
by 2020, or 11 percent of total population, from the current level of 7 percent,
3
 while the 
national fertility rate has fallen from 6.0 births per woman in 1970s to 3.0 in 1990, then 
to further to 2.3 in 2011.
4
 This implies that there will be a smaller number of children 
available for elderly parents to rely on. Furthermore, the literature observes a decline in 
the younger generation’s attitudes towards filial piety in economies which have 
experienced rapid income growth and westernization (Hermalin, 2000; Chan, 2005; 
Teo, 2010). Modernization also expanded opportunities for children and increased 
opportunity costs to their staying with elderly parents. 
These trends naturally undermine parents’ bargaining power in family decision-
making. Existing studies show that Indonesian elderly parents provide material and 
practical support to their children, often without reciprocal support (Cameron and Cobb-
Clark, 2001; Schroder-Butterfill, 2003). As a result, Indonesian elderly parents in 
coresidence may well experience a negative coresidence effect. 
 
3. Estimation 
We adopt the factor structure model of Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005). This 
framework provides a flexible yet parsimonious and tractable specification that yields 
easily interpretable expressions for both non-random selection by unobservables and 
heterogeneity in the coresidence effect. The original Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil 
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 Source: ILO (http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_124484/lang--en/index.htm)  
4
 Source: CIA World Factbook (http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=id&v=31) 
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model simultaneously estimates three binary equations for (1) selection, (2) treated 
outcomes, and (3) untreated outcomes. The identification of such a model is challenging 
for us, because we only have instruments with limited exogenous variation. We extend 
their binary outcome model by allowing for a five-categorical ordered outcome, 
combining health status information with the survival outcome. The treatment is 
coresidence. The treatment group is elderly parents who live with a child, while the 
control group is elderly parents who have at least one surviving child and do not live 
with a child. For each elderly parent i , 
iD  denotes treatment status: it takes 1 if the 
parent coresides with a child, and 0 otherwise. Let 
iY0  and iY1  be two potential outcomes 
for parent i  after seven years in the untreated ( 0iD ) and treated ( 1iD ) states, 
respectively. 
iY0  and iY1  are measured by categorical subjective health which can take 
five possible values: 4 for very healthy, 3 for healthy, 2 for somewhat unhealthy, 1 for 
unhealthy, and 0 for death. In this framework, it is assumed that 
iY0  and iY1  are defined 
for everyone, and that these health outcomes are independent across parents. 
As our dependent variables are all discrete, we employ a latent index framework. 
The coresidence equation is specified as 
(1) 
DiDii UZD  
* ,   otherwise  0  ; 0 if  1 *  iii DDD  
where iZ is a vector of observed characteristics that influence the family’s coresidence 
decision, D  denotes its associated parameters, and DiU  is a random error term that 
captures the unobserved costs of coresidence.
5
 *
iD  thus measures the net utility of 
coresidence. 
                                                          
5
 Following Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), the error terms in the three equations are defined as 
costs instead of benefits, without loss of generality. 
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 The health outcome equations for the untreated (j=0) and treated (j=1) states are 
specified as follows: 
(2) 
jijiji UXY  
* ,   1 ,0j  















       ,0  if  0
0  if  1
  if  2
  if  3
         if  4
*
*
1
1
*
2
2
*
3
3
*
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y




    
where 
iX  is a vector of observed characteristics, j  denotes its associated parameters, 
jiU  is an error term that captures unobserved health shocks, and 21,  , and 3  are cut-
off parameters. The exclusion restriction is satisfied when 
ii ZX  . The latent health 
variable, *
jiY  , has a structural interpretation: if it is positive, parent i  survives, and a 
larger value indicates better health. The cut-off points govern which category parent i ’s 
health falls into. Note that our extension of the original Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil 
model to incorporate health status information requires only a limited number of fairly 
reasonable extra assumptions: death comes below the worst health status,
6
 and the cut-
off parameter values are the same across individuals and across the untreated and 
treated states.
7
 The model makes no a priori assumption on the cardinality of health 
status. 
Following Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), we assume that the error terms 
in equations (1) and (2) are governed by the following normal factor structure:  
                                                          
6
 This is a standard assumption in the health economics literature (e.g. Grossman’s health capital model 
and the QALY weights literature). Also, beside mortality, subjective health is the most commonly used 
measure of individual health in the literature (Banks and Smith, 2011). Subjective health summarizes 
various aspects of individual health and has been found to be highly correlated with life expectancy and 
the prevalence of chronic diseases.  
7
 We assume that the four health categories provide a common metric for Indonesian elderly parents, at 
least approximately. Our approach is not appropriate if each parent perceives the categories and assesses 
their health in a significantly different way. 
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(3) ,DiiDiU    ,000 iiiU     
and  
iiiU 111   , 
where each of the random terms  10 ,,,  D  is assumed to follow the i.i.d. standard 
normal.
8
 This specification implies that  
(4) ,),(Cov 00 UUD  ,),(Cov 11 UUD
  
and 1010 ),(Cov UU . 
 Estimation relies on the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood function has 
the form 
(5)  
N
i iiii
dZXYDL
1
, )( ),,|,Pr(     
 
where   is the standard normal probability density function. Let   denote the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. The joint probability is given by:  
(6) ),,,|Pr(),|Pr(),,|,Pr(  iiiiiiiiii DXYZDZXYD     
 
where 
(7) ),(),|Pr( iDiii ZZD      
 
and for  1 ,0j ,  
 ),(),,|4Pr( 3  ijjiiiiji XjDXY  
),()(),,|3Pr( 32   ijjiijjiiiiji XXjDXY  
),()(),,|2Pr( 21   ijjiijjiiiiji XXjDXY  
and  ),()(),,|1Pr( 1  ijjiijjiiiiji XXjDXY  
).(1),,|0Pr( ijjiiiiji XjDXY    
To integrate i , a numerical approximation by Gauss-Hermite quadrature is used.  
An advantage of using the factor structure model is that the mean treatment 
parameter and the distributions of the treatment parameter can be obtained from the 
                                                          
8
 The normality assumption guarantees the following standard assumptions: (i) ),( 0UU D  and ),( 1UU D are 
independent of ),( XZ ; (ii) ),( 10 YY  have finite first moments; and (iii) 0)|1Pr(1  XD . 
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estimated structural parameters. Let   denote the treatment effect with regard to 
survival for a given parent:    1111 01  YY . Four quantities of interests are: (i) the 
average treatment effect (ATE); (ii) the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
and on the untreated (ATUT); (iii) the marginal treatment effect (MTE); and (iv) the 
marginal effect of covariate 
kx  on the ATE. Parameters (i) through (iii) measure the 
average effect under different conditions. The ATE measures the average effect for a 
parent chosen at random from the population. The ATT and ATUT measure the average 
effect for a parent who is in coresidence and for a parent who is not in coresidence, 
respectively. The MTE measures the average effect for a parent who is indifferent to 
coresidence for given values of covariates. Specifically, it is the average effect for a 
parent who is indifferent between coresiding and living independently if the (observed) 
instrument is externally set so that uUZ DD   (Equation (1)). A high value of u is 
associated with a high net cost of coresidence. For small values of u, the MTE is the 
average effect for a parent with unobserved characteristics that make the parent more 
likely to choose coresidence. The overall expected value of MTE is ATE. The marginal 
effect of observed characteristics on the ATE, (iv), tells us how the treatment effect 
varies across covariates and is informative in inferring the mechanism underlying the 
causal effect. Table 1 summarizes these parameters. We also compute the distributional 
parameters for the events, 0  ,1  , and 1 . The probability of a positive treatment 
effect,    xXYYxX  |0  ,1Pr|1Pr 01  is calculated as follows:  
(8)           dxxxXYY   1|0  ,1Pr 001101   .    
 X|0Pr   and  X|1Pr   are calculated in the same manner.  
[Insert Table 1] 
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 Summary estimates of all quantities of interest are found by integration over the 
empirical distribution of X . Standard errors are computed using the delta method. 
 
4. Data 
The data is derived from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a nationally 
representative longitudinal study of Indonesian households, collected by the RAND 
Corporation in collaboration with several Indonesian universities (Thomas et al., 2001). 
The IFLS began in 1993 with follow-ups administered in 1997, 2000, and 2007. We use 
the latest two waves of the IFLS: IFLS3 (2000), which provides base year information, 
and IFLS4 (2007), which provides health outcome information seven years later. The 
population of interest is elderly parents: individuals aged 60 years or older who have at 
least one adult child (aged 15 or above) in the base year.
9
 We exclude elderly parents 
whose spouse is younger than 55 to avoid the complication due to the presence of a 
non-elderly parent. Both the husband and wife are included as two observations when 
both of them are aged 60 or older. Our final sample consists of 1,768 elderly parents, of 
whom 69.8 percent lived with at least one child in 2000. 
The dependent variable is a five-category health outcome variable that takes a 
value of zero for death between 2000 and 2007. If an elderly parent survives, the 
dependent variable takes a value between 1 and 4, corresponding to the four self-
assessed health levels. The distribution of the health outcome variable is shown in Table 
2. It is lumpy around the two middle categories. Respondents appear to be conservative 
about placing themselves at the extremes of the health distribution. The sample seven 
                                                          
9
 This age threshold has been used by previous Indonesian studies (Hermalin, 2000; Cameron and Cobb-
Clark, 2001; Johar and Maruyama, 2011). The child may be a biological child, a stepchild, or an adopted 
child. Our definition of elderly parents does not include individuals who have only a child-in-law. 
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year mortality rate is 31.4 percent (4.0 percent per annum). The high mortality rate 
reflects the shorter life expectancy in Indonesia.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 also shows negative association between parental health and coresidence.  
Such association could be observed if parents with worse health conditions were more 
likely to be in coresidence. In Indonesian families, however, such reverse causation is 
unlikely. The baseline health status reported in the last two rows of Table 2 shows no 
substantial difference by coresidence status. Figure 1 clearly illustrates the negative 
association regardless of baseline health status suggesting that the negative association 
runs from coresidence to parental health. 
 [Insert Figure 1] 
Table 3 provides a description of all the variables used in this study. Individual 
characteristics include age, sex, baseline health conditions, economic status, and the 
presence and age of a spouse. For baseline health, we use self-assessed health and health 
conditions. The latter is constructed as the first factor from a factor analysis based on 
twelve health conditions.
10
 Socio-economic status includes working status, the presence 
of pension payments, education, ownership of the residential house, and household 
wealth measured in deciles.
11
 
[Insert Table 3] 
The last group of variables in Table 3 are our instruments. We use a combination 
of community-level and individual-level instruments. The community-level instruments 
are constructed based on adat (traditional practices) regarding inheritance and living 
                                                          
10
 The twelve measures are: time taken to sit and stand five times; two indicators for suffering from chest 
pain and persistent wounds; and the ability to perform nine activities of daily life (the full survey 
instruments can be accessed from http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html). 
11
 Wealth includes real estate, vehicles, jewellery, household appliances, livestock, receivables, and 
savings. Deciles are computed using the full sample of the IFLS households. 
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arrangements. A community is the smallest administrative unit in Indonesia and consists 
of 2,500 family heads on average.
12
 The IFLS contains 312 communities. Because 
communities in Indonesia are multicultural, a community does not uniquely determine 
adat, so the IFLS records the dominant adat in the community. For our purposes, we 
use the following adat variables: whether the parent’s house is traditionally transferred 
to the child in coresidence when the parent dies; whether inheritance is traditionally 
unequally distributed according to a child’s gender, birth order, and provision of 
informal care; how inheritance is traditionally shared among a bereaved family; and 
whether children live with parents after marriage.
13
 Each adat variable is binary, and we 
use a collection of them to fully exploit exogenous variation to enhance efficiency.  
We argue that adat provides valid instruments. In Indonesian communities, adat 
is still relevant, with only a fifth of IFLS communities indicate that “only a few people 
understand and still remember traditional laws” (IFLS2). Adat affects a family’s 
coresidence decision through social pressures and incentives, although parents do not 
make an explicit agreement in advance with a child to take care of or live with them in 
their old age. The tradition of bequeathing a house to children, for example, puts extra 
pressure on parents to pass it on to children, creating incentives for children to live with 
their parents 
While adat influences the coresidence decisions of families, it is hard to imagine 
that adat directly improves or worsens someone’s health, conditional on the baseline 
health and other covariates. A possible concern over the validity of adat as instruments 
arises if inheritance rules influence the amount and quality of informal care by altering 
                                                          
12
 Four administrative units in Indonesia from smallest to largest are: community or desa (village), 
kecamatan (district), kabupaten (municipality), and province (e.g. Jakarta). Today, there are 33 provinces, 
497 kabupaten, over 6,500 kecamatan, and over 75,000 communities. 
13
 Adat information was collected only twice, in IFLS2 and IFLS4. We use IFLS2 as it is closer to IFLS3.  
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children's incentive. In the Indonesian setting, however, there is little room for children 
to behave in such a strategic way, because elderly parents typically have very small 
non-property wealth to bequeath and houses are the major asset to be inherited. As a 
house is an indivisible asset, the amount and quality of care a coresiding child provides 
cannot substantially affect the level of inheritance the child expects.  
To reinforce the adat instruments, we also use two individual-level instruments: 
(1) whether the respondent’s spouse was chosen by his/her parents, and (2) the number 
of the children the respondent has. The former influences the coresidence decision 
because if it is a family’s tradition to choose a son-in-law or daughter-in-law, the choice 
ought to reflect the parents’ preferences for coresidence. The latter instrument affects 
the coresidence decision because having more children increases the likelihood of 
coresidence with a child. At the same time, these two instruments are unlikely to 
directly affect a parent’s health transition, conditional on the baseline health.14 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of all the covariates and instruments. 
Parents in coresidence tend to be younger and do not live with a spouse, or live with a 
younger spouse if married. They have younger children, greater wealth, and more 
children. They tend to live in a non-rented house and in communities that traditionally 
reward children equally and in communities where parents have greater power in the 
marital decision of their children.  
[Insert Table 4]  
 
5. Results 
                                                          
14
 The latter instrument violates the exogeneity condition if the presence of siblings affects how a child 
cares for his/her parents, as discussed in Bernheim et al.’s (1985) strategic bequest motive hypothesis. In 
the Indonesian setting, however, the strategic bequest motive appears to be limited, because of very little 
non-property wealth to bequeath. 
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In this section, we first present simple linear survival models to outline characteristics 
of the data and to discuss the validity of the instruments. We then report the results of 
the full model. At the end of the section, we discuss the robustness of our results. 
5.1.  Linear Survival Analysis 
The dependent variable is seven year survival. Table 5 reports three simple estimates of 
the coresidence effect: [1] the unconditional average effect; [2] the average effect from 
a linear probability model (LPM); and [3] the average effect from a linear probability 
model with instruments (LPM-IV).  
[Insert Table 5] 
The unconditional average effect is significant at the 5 percent level, showing that 
the seven year mortality rate for parents in coresidence is 5.3 percentage points higher 
than for those who have a child but live independently. Column [2] indicates a mild 
negative selection on observables: once we control for observable characteristics, the 
average coresidence effect reduces to 3.6 percentage points and becomes insignificant, 
but more than half of the mortality gap remains. When we also control for selection on 
unobservables (column [3]), the coresidence effect increases to 8.5 percentage points. 
Although not significant, this increase in the size of coresidence effect indicates the 
presence of a positive selection bias due to unobservables. Elderly parents with 
unobservable traits that contribute to their survival probability — such as inherent 
health, mental strength, and strong family altruism and reciprocity — are more likely to 
enter coresidence, after controlling for observables.  
Standard tests support the validity of our instruments. In the first-stage regression, 
the instruments are jointly significant (p-value = 0.00), indicating that they are strong 
predictors of coresidence. The overidentification test of the independence of all 
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instruments and the error term in the survival equation cannot be rejected (p-
value=0.353).  
5.2.  Coresidence Equation  
The full model estimates the coresidence equation and the two health outcome equations 
simultaneously. Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates of the coresidence equation 
(Equation (1)), which should be interpreted as correlation rather than causation, because 
unobserved confounding factors may exist.  
[Insert Table 6] 
The statistical significance of many covariates confirms non-random selection 
into coresidence. Coresidence is less likely for old couples and mothers. This is 
consistent with existing Indonesian studies (Schroder-Butterfill, 2003; Johar and 
Maruyama, 2011) and other studies from neighbouring Southeast Asian countries (Chan, 
2005). Holding parental age constant, the parents of younger children are more likely to 
coreside. Coresidence is also more likely when parents work, receive a pension, have 
smaller wealth, own a house, engage in the community, and live in an urban area as a 
non-Muslim. The two health variables have no significant power in explaining 
coresidence; hence, it is not the baseline health gap that generates the negative 
coresidence effect. Most adat rules are significant predictors of coresidence.  
5.3.  Health Outcome Equations 
Table 7 reports the results of the two health outcome equations. In both states, younger 
parents are more likely to have a better health outcome, and so are mothers, reflecting 
the higher life expectancy of females. Naturally, subjective health and existing health 
conditions at the baseline are strong predictors of health outcomes seven years later. 
Work, a spouse, and community involvement lead to a better health outcome if parents 
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live with a child. Our interpretation of these findings is the importance of parents’ social 
interactions to avoid excessive reliance on coresiding children and associated 
undesirable effects of coresidence. Wealth is another variable with a significantly 
contrasting effect across the coresidence states: greater wealth improves the health of 
parents only when the parent does not live with a child. While wealth potentially 
protects health, it may attract more dependent children (Johar and Maruyama, 2011). 
The number of siblings has a significant protective effect only when a parent lives 
without a child, suggesting the role that siblings may play as alternative care providers 
in the absence of children. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 The three cut-off points for ordered health outcomes are relative to the threshold 
for death that is normalized to zero. They are precisely estimated and have reasonable 
values. The large difference between 
2ˆ  and 3ˆ  reflects the fact that a very small share 
of parents answered that they were “very healthy”.  
 The factor structure parameter,  , enters the health outcome equations with the 
coefficient parameters, 0  and 1 . A model with no selection on unobservables implies 
010  . The estimates of 0  and 1  are reported in the row with the heading 
Factor( ). They have different signs, capturing heterogeneity in the treatment effect 
due to unobservables, although a model without selection cannot be formally rejected 
(p-value = 0.23). 
5.4.  Treatment Effects  
Based on the full model, the treatment effect parameters are computed and 
reported in Table 8. The ATE predicts a higher mortality rate by 10 percentage points or 
1.4 percentage points per annum on a parent drawn randomly from the entire elderly 
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parent population. Although not significant at the conventional significance levels, this 
estimate indicates that a substantially positive average coresidence effect is unlikely to 
exist. The next rows present the distributional parameters of the ATE: if coresidence 
were randomly assigned, 12.5 percent of parents would avoid death due to coresidence, 
65.0 percent would not be affected by coresidence, and 22.5 percent would die because 
of coresidence.  
[Insert Table 8] 
 The ATT is significant at the 5 percent level, implying that if parents in 
coresidence had not chosen to coreside, their seven year survival rate would have been 
18.9 percentage points higher (or 2.5 percentage points per annum). The ATUT is 
estimated to be positive 0.123. These estimates indicate heterogeneity in the coresidence 
effect: elderly parents who were in coresidence in the base year are those who are prone 
to suffer from an undesirable treatment effect. 
 Heterogeneity in the coresidence effect can be attributed to observed and 
unobserved factors. Table 9 reports correlation estimates between observables, 
unobservables, and the treatment effect. The first three rows provide correlations among 
the selection and health outcome variables in terms of observed and unobserved factors. 
The two health outcome equations ),( *1
*
0 YY  are strongly and positively correlated due to 
the strong positive correlation of observable factors ),( 10  XX . The unobserved factors 
),( 10 UU  are negatively correlated. The correlation between selection and health outcome 
exhibits different signs across the coresidence and non-coresidence states. In terms of 
both observables and unobservables, factors that induce coresidence are positively 
correlated with factors that benefits health outcomes in the non-coresidence state, 
whereas the factors that induce coresidence are negatively correlated with health factors 
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in the coresidence state. Taking these relationships altogether, the last three rows show 
the negative relationship between coresidence and the coresidence effect, where both 
observables and unobservables contribute to the negative relationship.   
[Insert Table 9] 
Figure 2 plots the point estimate of the MTE with its 95 percent confidence 
intervals. The horizontal axis represents the value of 
DU , which is labelled by its 
cumulative probability value. A higher value of 
DU  implies a lower probability of 
coresidence (see Equation (1)). The upward sloping MTE curve implies that in terms of 
unobservables, parents who are more likely to be in coresidence (i.e. those who have a 
small 
DU ) are more likely to experience a significant health decline under coresidence 
than those who are less likely to coreside. This reflects the negative ),( 01 UUUCorr D  . 
Recall that in our notation, a larger value of )( 01 UU   makes the coresidence effect 
worse. Unobserved factors underlying the heterogeneous effect might capture the 
dependence of children, parental altruism, other intergenerational relationship, or 
unobserved physical or mental health disposition. In the present analysis, we are 
agnostic about the underlying unobservables. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Observables also generate heterogeneity in the coresidence effect, and they are 
informative in inferring the mechanism underlying the causal effect. Table 10 reports 
the marginal effects of observed characteristics on the ATE. Significant marginal effect 
is found for only one variable – community engagement. Parents who have little 
community engagement tend to be those who experience greater health deterioration 
due to coresidence. The same relationship is found for working and marital status, 
although with much lower significance. These findings indicate the importance of social 
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interaction to avoid an undesirable coresidence effect on parental health. Social 
activities may help parents to avoid excessive dependence on coresiding children and 
associated conflicts, by maintaining their mental well-being and subjective happiness. 
The positive effect of social interactions may also come from changes in children’s 
behavior. In small closed communities, more widely networked parents may generate 
incentives to children to do well in their education and job, and to increase the attention 
and care given to parents to maintain a good family image and avoid being labelled as 
an ungrateful child.
15
  
[Insert Table 10] 
The use of ordered health outcomes allows us to compute the ATE on health 
status. Table 11 shows the conditional ATEs, with associated unconditional transition 
rates for reference. For parents who are healthy in the base year, coresidence lowers 
their probability of becoming ‘very healthy’ by 5.17 percentage points and ‘somewhat 
healthy’ by 8.92 percentage points. At the same time, their probability of health 
deterioration into the two unhealthy states increases by 4.3 percentage points and their 
probability of death increases by 9.14 percentage points. The baseline health status does 
not affect the coresidence effect: coresidence similarly shifts the health outcome 
distribution of those who are unhealthy in the base year downward.  
[Insert Table 11] 
5.5. Robustness of Results 
The estimated ATE and ATT are 10.0 and 18.9 percentage points, respectively (1.4 and 
2.5 percentage points per annum). These large effects are not implausible given that we 
are concerned with the population aged 60 and above in Indonesia. The national life 
                                                          
15
 A reverse causation might be possible: parents limit their social interaction when taking care of their 
children occupies their time and resources. Disentangling the causal mechanism here is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
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expectancy at age 60 at the study period is around 77.4 years.
16
 The seven year 
mortality rate for our sample is 31.4 percent, and the seven year mortality rate for those 
above 80 is 60.1 percent. The unconditional mean difference by coresidence status 
obtained from the raw data is already as large as 5.3 percentage points (Table 5), and 
11.0 percentage points if we only use those above 70.  
However, because we estimate a flexible model by relying on community-level 
instruments, the robustness of our results may be of concern. To ensure the robustness 
of our results we provide a series of sensitivity analyses. First, we estimate our main 
model with various sets of instrumental variables. We experiment with different 
permutations of the instruments, including those used in our preferred model, two 
additional adat variables, several family-level variables, and community-level time 
trends in the age structure and family size between 1993 and 2000. The negative 
coresidence effect is found in all specifications, indicating our results are not driven by 
a particular instrument or by a particular combination of instruments.
17 
Furthermore, we 
also estimate a variant of our preferred model in which Inherit_care is included as one 
of the covariates rather than as an instrument. This is to address to the concern that the 
inheritance rule that relates to the amount of care might influence the amount and 
quality of care a child in coresidence provides. If this specific adat influences care 
quality, it violates the exogeneity condition. The results confirm that this is not the case: 
the estimated ATE and ATT are almost the same as our preferred model (–10.1 and –
18.6, respectively), and the ATE does not vary by Inherit_care.  
As another instrumental variable validation test, we study how our covariates 
vary along our instruments. If the covariates in the health outcome equation and the 
                                                          
16
 Source: Medika Consulting, “Indonesia life expectancy history”, Indonesia (http://www.medika-
consulting.com/website/26378/images/htmleditorfiles/INDONESIA-health-data-medikaconsulting.pdf).  
17
 Results are in online Appendix to the paper. 
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instruments always move together, this raises concerns about the instruments. Since we 
have multiple instruments, we run a simple probit regression of coresidence on only the 
instruments, generate a propensity score, and divide it into quartiles. At the 5% 
significance level, we find that the propensity scores are: (1) balanced (statistically 
indifferent) across top and bottom quartiles for 10 of the 18 covariates; (2) balanced 
across the top and bottom half of the distribution for 2 covariates; (3) non-monotonic 
for 4 covariates; and (4) different in the top quartile to any other quartiles for 2 
covariates but the difference is not significant at the 1% level. Thus, it is fairly 
reasonable to conclude that our instruments pass this test. 
To confirm robustness with respect to econometric specification, we estimate the 
ATE based on several competing models. The results reported in Table 12 are 
summarized as follows. While addressing selection on unobservables increases the size 
of the ATE, the use of our instruments leads to large standard errors. Allowing 
heterogeneous treatment effect also increases the standard errors because identification 
becomes more challenging. On the other hand, combining mortality and health 
information increases precision. When we attempt binary outcome models that 
addresses selection on unobservables and heterogeneous treatment effect, their estimates 
are sensitive to specifications and convergence is often unstable. The results of three-
category models, in which we aggregate “very healthy” and “somewhat healthy” into 
“healthy” and “somewhat unhealthy” and “unhealthy” into “unhealthy”, indicate the 
robustness of our results with respect to the way we construct our dependent variable. 
Overall, the direction of the ATE is consistently negative. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
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We also conduct a simple goodness-of-fit test. Based on 5,000 Monte Carlo 
simulation draws of  10 ,,,  D , we check to what extent our models can correctly 
predict both the coresidence status and five-categorical health outcome. Our baseline 
specification is an independent combination of a binary probit for coresidence and a 
standard ordered probit for health outcomes. This baseline model correctly predicts 
24.7% of the observed data, whereas our factor structure model correctly predicts 25.0%. 
Thus our factor structure model is able to reproduce the observed data fairly reasonably. 
As another sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate the model using three alternative 
health measures: (1) the number of days in the last four weeks in which the respondent 
stayed in bed due to illness; (2) the number of days in the last four weeks in which the 
respondent missed primary activities due to poor health; and (3) the interviewer’s health 
assessment.
18
 These health measures are combined with mortality. All three health 
measures produce consistent findings: a negative ATE of similar magnitude and a much 
worse ATT, illustrating the robustness of our findings. 
Lastly, although the negative sign of the coresidence effect is consistently found 
throughout the above robustness checks, the large standard error of the ATE and the 
large magnitude of the ATT may cast doubt over the precision and generalizability of 
our results. Our conservative view is that, even though we lack a strong evidence of a 
negative ATE, given the magnitude and robustness of the ATE, a sizeable positive 
coresidence effect on parental health is unlikely. The fact that our instruments mainly 
consist of community-level dummy variables is likely to be one reason of the large 
standard errors. Future research with better data is required to further validate our 
results. The distributional assumptions of the single factor structure may be a source of 
                                                          
18
 Guided by the empirical distribution of each variable, we construct ordered variables: the number of 
days in bed is a binary variable (0 day, 1+ day); the number of missed days has four categories (0 day, 0-1 
days, 4-7 days, 7+ days); and the nurse assessment also has four groups (1–4, 5, 6, 7–9). 
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the large ATT, because its functional form assumption restricts the way the 
heterogeneous treatment effect is distributed (Figure 2). The implication of the one-
factor structure assumption in our context is left for future research. 
   
6. Conclusion 
In many countries where the public old age welfare program is underdeveloped or non-
existent, coresidence with a child has been the most comprehensive form of old age 
security for elderly parents and is expected to remain prevalent in the foreseeable 
future.
19
 In this paper, we investigate whether coresidence has a positive effect on 
parental health. We achieve this by addressing non-random selection on unobservables 
and heterogeneity in the coresidence effect – two major problems in the evaluation 
literature that have been largely overlooked in previous studies on this topic. We find 
evidence of negative coresidence effect and heterogeneity in the coresidence effect. 
Elderly parents who are more likely to experience a negative effect tend to self-select 
into coresidence. Our results also suggest that those who lack social interactions are 
more likely to live with children and suffer from a negative coresidence effect. 
Our findings have important policy implications for relying on informal care as 
the primary strategy to provide old age security. The population is aging rapidly in 
middle-income and developing countries in Asia. At the same time, modernization 
erodes the customs and values of large traditional families in these countries. In 
response to these trends, politicians often emphasize the value of ‘traditional families’ 
in public rhetoric (Teo, 2010). Some countries even offer financial incentives for filial 
                                                          
19
 Throughout Asia, it is estimated that the Asian population aged over 60 will increase almost three times 
from 9 percent in 2000 to 24 percent by 2050. 
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piety; for example, Malaysia and Singapore give subsidies to coresiding families.
20
 The 
negative coresidence effect, however, suggests that this traditional living arrangement 
and the policies which encourage it may result in an unintended adverse outcome in the 
health of the elderly. In developing aged care infrastructures, policymakers should 
recognize the importance of the elderly’s social participation in local communities. 
There may be scope for designing community-based programs for elderly individuals to 
expand their social activities network outside their family. 
   
                                                          
20
 Malaysia provides tax incentives for in-home care of sick older persons and Singapore has housing tax 
incentives for children who live with their elderly parents. 
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where )(XFX  is the distribution of X .  
Note:   denotes the treatment effect with regard to survival for a given parent:    1111 01  YY .
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Table 2: Distribution of health outcomes after 7 years and baseline health 
  All Non-Coresidence Coresidence 
  Count % Count % Count % 
Total 1,768 100%  534 100% 1,234 100% 
Health outcomes in 2007 
     
4: Very healthy 41 2.32% 15 2.81% 26 2.11% 
3: Healthy 735 41.57% 247 46.25% 488 39.55% 
2: Unhealthy 385 21.78% 111 20.79% 274 22.20% 
1: Very unhealthy 52 2.94% 13 2.43% 39 3.16% 
0: Death 555 31.39% 148 27.72% 407 32.98% 
Baseline health in 2000 
     
Healthy/very healthy 1,292 73.08% 396 74.16% 896 72.61% 
Unhealthy/very unhealthy 476 26.92% 138 25.84% 338 27.39% 
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Table 3.  Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Y =0 for death; 1 for unhealthy; 2 for some unhealthy; 3 for some healthy; 4 for very healthy 
Survive =1 if elderly parent is alive in 2007; 0 otherwise 
Coresidence =1 if elderly parent lives with at least one child; 0 otherwise  
Explanatory variables 
Age Age  
Female =1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Wspouse
 
=1 if live with spouse; 0 otherwise  
Spouseage Spouse’s age 
Childage Age of youngest child 
Nmsib The number of siblings 
Subjhealth =1 for healthy; 0 otherwise 
Healthconditions The first factor from a factor analysis based on 12 health condition measures: 9 ADL 
indicating difficulty in performing daily task, nurse measurement of time taken to sit and 
stand 5 times, suffering from chest pain and suffering from persistent wound 
Work =1 if currently working for income; 0 otherwise 
Education =0 for no schooling; 1 for primary school; 2 for higher than primary school 
Pension =1 if has pension income; 0 otherwise 
Wealth Decile of household wealth  
House =1 if the house is not a rental property (i.e. owned by household member(s)); 0 otherwise  
Javanese =1 if ethnicity is Javanese (the majority); 0 otherwise 
Community # of participation in a series of community activities in the last 12 months 
Muslim =1 if Muslim; 0 otherwise 
Rural =1 if rural area; 0 otherwise 
Java =1 if reside in provinces in Java Island (most populated) ; 0 otherwise 
Instrumental variables 
Inherit_house^ =1 if traditionally parental house is inherited to the child who lives with the parent when 
he/she dies; 0 otherwise 
Inherit_care^ =1 if traditionally inheritance sharing rule is based on the amount of care provided to 
parents; 0 otherwise  
Inherit_gender^ =1 if traditionally inheritance sharing rule differs for sons and daughters; 0 otherwise  
Inherit_order^ =1 if traditionally inheritance sharing rule is based on child’s birth order; 0 otherwise  
Inherit_child1^ =1 if traditionally children are the sole recipient of their mother’s inheritance; 0 otherwise 
Inherit_child2^ =1 if traditionally children are the sole recipient of their father’s inheritance; 0 otherwise  
Inherit_child3^ =1 if traditionally children share inheritance claim with the grieving parent; 0 otherwise  
Parenthouse^ =1 if traditionally married couples stay at parent’s house; 0 otherwise  
Parentchoose^ =1 if parent chose the respondent’s first husband/wife ; 0 otherwise  
Nmchildren The number of surviving children 
Nmchildrensq Nmchildren squared 
Note: ^Based on adat survey.  
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Table 4. Means and standard deviation of variables  
  
1768 elderly parents 
 
1234 parents in 
coresidence 
 
534 parents living 
without child 
   Means std.dev Means std.dev Means std.dev 
Survive 0.69 0.46 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 
Coresidence 0.70 0.46     
Age 68.72 7.03 68.46 6.86 69.32 7.37 
Female 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.49 
Wspouse 0.59 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.70 0.46 
Spouseage* 66.14 7.68 65.14 7.20 67.92 8.17 
Childage 30.29 9.22 29.39 9.29 32.39 8.70 
Nmsib 2.18 1.99 2.18 2.02 2.16 1.90 
Subjhealth 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.45 0.74 0.44 
Healthconditions -0.00 0.95 -0.04 0.91 0.11 0.97 
Work 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Education 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.57 0.64 
Pension 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
Wealth 5.78 2.69 6.10 2.59 5.03 2.76 
House 0.93 0.26 0.94 0.24 0.90 0.30 
Javanese 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Muslim 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.33 0.84 0.37 
Community 0.86 1.15 0.82 1.12 0.95 1.20 
Java 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49 
Rural 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.70 0.46 
Inherit_house 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Inherit_care 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49 
Inherit_gender 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 
Inherit_order 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 
Inherit_child1 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47 
Inherit_child2 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Inherit_child3 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Parenthouse 0.76 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 
Parentchoose 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Nmchildren 4.41 2.38 4.65 2.46 3.88 2.10 
Note: * statistics computed based on those with a spouse.  
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Table 5. Linear regressions of 7-year survival 
  Average difference [1] 
 
LPM [2] 
 
IV-LPM [3] 
   Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Coresidence -0.053 -2.24 -0.036 -1.54 -0.085 -0.57 
Age   -0.006 -3.38 -0.006 -3.40 
Female   0.192 6.73 0.190 6.39 
Wspouse   0.056 0.56 0.058 0.60 
Spouseage   0.000 -0.14 0.000 -0.27 
Childage   -0.003 -2.01 -0.004 -1.46 
Nmsib   0.005 0.90 0.005 0.91 
Subjhealth   0.066 2.45 0.067 2.47 
Healthconditions   -0.103 -7.46 -0.103 -7.42 
Work   0.043 1.80 0.038 1.31 
Education   -0.019 -1.00 -0.018 -0.91 
Pension   0.062 1.61 0.057 1.39 
Wealth   -0.003 -0.59 -0.001 -0.20 
House   0.047 1.10 0.052 1.15 
Javanese   0.016 0.64 0.014 0.54 
Muslim   -0.083 -2.75 -0.080 -2.53 
Community   0.033 3.19 0.032 2.90 
Java   -0.039 -1.52 -0.038 -1.47 
Rural   0.032 1.34 0.028 1.11 
Constant   1.029 6.91 1.079 5.00 
Note: The dependent variable takes a value of one if the respondent is alive in 2007 and zero otherwise. 
White’s robust standard errors are used. LPM stands for linear probability model. The sample size is 
1,768.   
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Table 6. Selection equation: coresidence 
  Coeff. t-value M.E.   Coeff. t-value M.E. 
Age -0.006 -0.701 -0.001 Inherit_house 0.212 1.903 0.044 
Female -0.347 -2.453 -0.073 Inherit_care -0.421 -3.468 -0.088 
Wspouse 0.148 0.279 0.031 Inherit_gender 0.210 1.795 0.044 
Spouseage -0.018 -2.495 -0.004 Inherit_order -0.077 -0.449 -0.016 
Childage -0.051 -6.861 -0.011 Inherit_child1 0.438 2.862 0.092 
Nmsib 0.011 0.401 0.002 Inherit_child2 -0.324 -1.820 -0.068 
Subjhealth 0.017 0.139 0.004 Inherit_child3 -0.125 -1.055 -0.026 
Healthcondition
s 
0.029 0.469 0.006 Parenthouse 0.138 1.056 0.029 
Work -0.485 -4.382 -0.102 Parentchoose 0.119 1.128 0.025 
Education 0.071 0.779 0.015 Nmchildren -0.050 -0.658 -0.010 
Pension  -0.557 -2.953 -0.117 Nmchildrensq 0.014 2.007 0.003 
Wealth 0.121 5.922 0.025 Constant 2.355 3.337 
 
House 0.446 2.338 0.093 
    
Javanese -0.136 -1.078 -0.029 
    
Muslim 0.258 1.725 0.054 
   
 
Community -0.118 -2.364 -0.025 
    
Java 0.181 1.392 0.038 
    
Rural -0.398 -3.439 -0.083 
   
 
Note: M.E. denotes marginal effects defined as the analytical derivative averaged over the entire sample. 
The sample size is 1,768. 
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Table 7. Outcome equations: health outcomes after 7 years 
  Not in coresidence In coresidence 
  Coeff. t-value M.E. Coeff. t-value M.E. 
Age -0.011 -1.154 -0.002 -0.018 -2.486 -0.005 
Female 0.533 2.969 0.105 0.594 4.209 0.156 
Wspouse -0.042 -0.056 -0.008 0.648 1.807 0.170 
Spouseage -0.003 -0.280 -0.001 -0.006 -1.256 -0.002 
Childage -0.008 -0.709 -0.002 -0.008 -1.234 -0.002 
Nmsib 0.055 1.846 0.011 -0.003 -0.134 -0.001 
Subjhealth 0.277 1.800 0.055 0.319 3.253 0.084 
HealthConditions -0.444 -4.506 -0.088 -0.314 -5.007 -0.083 
Work 0.060 0.437 0.012 0.196 1.825 0.052 
Education -0.131 -1.223 -0.026 -0.021 -0.318 -0.006 
Pension 0.377 1.648 0.074 0.218 1.475 0.057 
Wealth 0.039 1.236 0.008 -0.013 -0.685 -0.003 
House 0.116 0.524 0.023 0.225 1.392 0.059 
Javanese 0.161 1.090 0.032 0.177 1.869 0.046 
Muslim -0.238 -1.291 -0.047 -0.071 -0.543 -0.019 
Community -0.022 -0.414 -0.004 0.131 2.743 0.034 
Java 0.067 0.433 0.013 -0.115 -1.183 -0.030 
Rural 0.112 0.757 0.022 0.120 1.380 0.032 
Constant 1.429 1.303  1.086 1.948  
Factor ( ˆ ) 0.575 1.389 
 
-0.507 -1.237 
 
Cut-off parameters           
1ˆ  0.104 5.301 
    2ˆ  0.811 7.154 
    
3ˆ  3.038 7.693         
Note: M.E. denotes marginal effects defined as the analytical derivative averaged over the entire sample. 
The sample size is 1,768. 
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Table 8: Mean and distributional treatment parameters on 7-year survival 
ATE (average treatment effect): -0.100 
Standard error: 0.078 
p-value: 0.197 
)1( Pr   (probability of survival due to coresidence): 0.125 
)0( Pr   (probability of no effect on survival): 0.650 
)1( Pr   (probability of death due to coresidence): 0.225 
ATT (average treatment effect on the treated): -0.189 
Standard error: 0.095 
p-value: 0.046 
ATUT (average treatment effect on the untreated): 0.123 
Standard error: 0.119 
p-value: 0.300 
Note: Treatment parameters are computed based on the point estimates of the full model. 
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Table 9: Correlations between observables, unobservables, and treatment effect 
),( 10  XXCorr  0.815 ),( 0 XZCorr D  0.094 ),( 1 XZCorr D  -0.150 
),( 10 UUCorr  -0.225 ),( 0UUCorr D  0.353 ),( 1UUCorr D  -0.320 
),( *1
*
0 YYCorr  
0.813 ),( *0
* YDCorr  0.094 ),( *1
* YDCorr  -0.150 
 ),( 01  XXZCorr D  -0.396    
 ),( 01 UUUCorr D  -0.430    
 ),( *0
*
1
* YYDCorr  -0.396    
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Table 10. Marginal effects (M.E.) of covariates on average treatment effect (ATE) 
  M.E. on ATE t-value   M.E. on ATE t-value 
Age -0.002 -0.876 Pension -0.017 -0.248 
Female 0.051 0.885 Wealth -0.011 -1.486 
Wspouse 0.179 0.985 House 0.036 0.556 
Spouseage -0.001 -0.423 Javanese 0.015 0.359 
Childage 0.000 -0.135 Muslim 0.028 0.501 
Nmsib -0.012 -1.348 Community 0.039 2.556 
Subjhealth 0.029 0.716 Java -0.043 -1.080 
Healthconditions 0.005 0.147 Rural 0.009 0.233 
Work 0.040 0.978 
   
Education 0.020 0.679 
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Table 11: Health transition matrix and conditional ATEs 
  Baseline health status (2000) 
Health outcome (2007) 
Healthy Unhealthy 
(Very /somewhat healthy) (Very /somewhat unhealthy) 
Very healthy 
  Transition rate (%)  2.79   1.05 
ATE (ppts) –5.17 –2.22 
Somewhat healthy 
  Transition rate (%) 47.76   24.79 
ATE (ppts) –8.92 –11.70 
Somewhat unhealthy 
  Transition rate (%) 20.12 26.26 
ATE (ppts) +4.21 +1.05 
Unhealthy 
  Transition rate (%)   2.71   3.57 
ATE (ppts) +0.07 +0.05 
Dead 
  Transition rate (%) 26.63   44.33 
ATE (ppts) +9.14 +12.40 
 
  
46 
 
Table 12: ATE on survival from competing models  
  ATE t-stat 
(1) Unconditional mean differences 
a,e 
-0.053 -2.233 
(2) Linear probability model without selection on unobservables 
b,c,e
 -0.036 -1.542 
(3) Linear IV 
b,d,e
 -0.085 -0.569 
(4) Probit model without selection on unobservables 
c,e,f
 -0.036 -1.496 
(5) Probit model IV 
d,e,f
 -0.104 -0.450 
(6) Probit model, heterogeneous effect, without selection on unobservables 
c,e,f
 -0.025 -0.258 
(7) Probit model, heterogeneous effect, selection on unobservables 
d,e,f
 Convergence unstable 
(8) 3 categorical, constant effect, without selection on unobservables 
c,f,g
 -0.044 -2.172 
(9) 3 categorical, heterogeneous effect, without selection on unobservables 
c,f,h
 -0.038 -0.455 
(10) 3 categorical, heterogeneous effect, selection on unobservables 
d,f
 -0.110 -1.449 
(11) 5 categorical, constant effect, without selection on unobservables 
c,f,g
 -0.048 -2.492 
(12) 5 categorical, heterogeneous effect, without selection on unobservables 
c,f,h
 -0.039 -0.483 
(13) 5 categorical, heterogeneous effect, selection on unobservables (our 
preferred model) 
d,f
 
-0.100 -1.293 
Note: 3 categories consist of {Healthy, Unhealthy, Dead} and 5 categories {Very health, Somewhat 
health, Somewhat unhealthy, Unhealthy, Dead} 
a
 Ê(Y1|D = 1) − Ê(Y0|D = 0). 
b
 Linear probability model of Survive on Coresidence and other covariates with a common treatment 
assumption, Y = Xβ + γD + U. 
c
 Coresidence is assumed to be exogenous. 
d
 Coresidence is assumed to be endogenous and estimation is with the instruments listed in Table 3. 
e
 The dependent variable Y = 1 if a parent survives and 0 otherwise. 
f
 Maximum likelihood estimation with normally distributed unobservables. 
g
 A standard ordered probit model.
 
h
 No selection on unobservables imposes α0 = α1 = 0. 
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Figure 1: Baseline health, health outcomes, and coresidence status 
 
Note: The vertical axis indicates the sample proportion for each health outcome. For example, 46 percent 
of coresiding parents who were unhealthy in the base year died within the next seven years. 
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Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) 
 
Note: The horizontal axis represents the value of DU , labelled by its cumulative probability. The vertical 
axis measures the size of the MTE.  
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